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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
THOMPSON, District Judge 
 
 Appellant Ryan S. Watson (“Watson”), individually 
and on behalf of the Watson Family Gun Trust, filed this 
action claiming that the de facto ban on the possession of a 
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machine gun1 found in 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is unconstitutional 
facially and as-applied to him under the Second Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution.  Alternatively, Watson argues that § 
922(o) does not apply to the Watson Family Gun Trust 
because it only applies to “persons” and a trust is not a 
“person” under the statute’s definition.  The District Court 
granted the government’s motion to dismiss, explaining that 
under the Supreme Court’s opinion in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and this Court’s opinion in 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), the 
Second Amendment does not protect the possession of 
machine guns.  Moreover, the Court found that a trust is not 
exempt from § 922(o) because a trust is not an entity distinct 
from its trustees, and therefore it cannot own property.  
Because we agree that the Second Amendment does not 
protect the possession of machine guns, and because trustees, 
and by extension trusts, are not exempt from § 922(o), we 
affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 The National Firearms Act provides that prior to 
manufacturing a firearm, any prospective maker must apply 
for permission from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF).  26 U.S.C. §§ 5822, 5841.  
ATF will deny the application if making or possessing the 
firearm would place the person applying in violation of any 
law.  See 26 U.S.C. § 5822; 27 C.F.R. § 479.65.  Although a 
machine gun qualifies as a firearm under the National 
Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), a separate federal law, the 
                                                          
1 Federal statutes and caselaw alternate between the spellings 
“machinegun” and “machine gun.”  We will use “machine 
gun” except when quoting materials that spell the term 
otherwise. 
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Gun Control Act, prohibits the private manufacture of 
machine guns in most instances by making it unlawful for any 
person “to transfer or possess a machine gun,” with narrow 
exceptions for certain government entities and machine guns 
lawfully possessed before 1986.  18 U.S.C. § 922(o).  The 
Gun Control Act defines a “person” as an “individual, 
corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, 
or joint stock company.”  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(1). 
 
Watson is the sole trustee of the Watson Family Gun 
Trust (“the Trust”).  On May 23, 2014 and June 24, 2014, 
Watson submitted applications on behalf of the Trust for 
permission to make and register an M-16-style machine gun.  
On August 5, 2014, an ATF examiner mistakenly approved 
one of Watson’s applications.  Shortly thereafter, Watson had 
a machine gun manufactured pursuant to that approval.  
However, on or about September 10, 2014, ATF informed 
Watson that the approval had been a mistake and that his 
application had been “disapproved.”  ATF explained in a 
letter that Watson’s application was denied because he was 
prohibited by law from possessing a machine gun.  Watson 
claimed to be exempt from the prohibition on possessing 
machine guns because he had applied on behalf of a trust, 
which he argued was not a “person” covered by the Gun 
Control Act.  ATF explained that although a trust is not a 
“person” under the Act, a trust cannot legally make or hold 
property.  Therefore, ATF considers the individual acting on 
behalf of the trust to be the proposed maker and possessor of 
the machine gun.   
  
Watson received a telephone call from an ATF agent 
on October 10, 2014 inquiring whether a machine gun had 
been made pursuant to the initial application approval.  The 
ATF agent indicated that if any machine gun had been made, 
the gun must be surrendered to ATF.  On November 14, 
2014, Watson met with an ATF agent and surrendered his 
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machine gun under protest.  That same day, he filed suit 
against the U.S. Attorney General and the ATF Director 
(collectively, “the government”), seeking declarative and 
injunctive relief from 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et 
seq., and the implementing regulations found in 27 C.F.R. § 
479.1 et seq.  Watson alleged that these statutory and 
regulatory provisions act as a de facto ban on an entire class 
of arms in violation of the Commerce Clause and the Second, 
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution.  
Additionally, Watson alleged violations of his due process 
rights under the Fifth Amendment and his equal protection 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as a claim 
for detrimental reliance based on the ATF’s initial approval of 
his application.  The government separately initiated a 
forfeiture action for Watson’s machine gun, which was later 
consolidated with his challenge.   
 
On January 16, 2015, the government moved to 
dismiss Watson’s action for lack of standing and failure to 
state a claim.  On July 22, 2015, the District Court ruled that 
Watson did have standing, but that he failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.2  Among other holdings, 
the Court held that Watson failed to state a claim under the 
Second Amendment because the Second Amendment does 
not protect the possession of machine guns.  He appeals that 
decision as well as the District Court’s finding that a trust is 
incapable of owning a machine gun under § 922(o).  Because 
these are the only issues briefed by Watson on appeal, we will 
not discuss the District Court’s other holdings.  See Laborers’ 
                                                          
2 On appeal, the government continued to argue that Watson 
lacked standing, but based on Watson’s position at oral 
argument that he is challenging the Gun Control Act and not 
the National Firearms Act, the government essentially 
conceded this point. 
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Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy 
Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (issues not briefed on 
appeal are waived).  However, we note that all of Watson’s 
claims against the government were dismissed.   
 
The government’s consolidated forfeiture claims are 
still pending, which led us to question whether the decision 
being appealed was a final order, and thus whether we had 
jurisdiction.  But on August 13, 2015, the District Court 
issued a certification of entry of final judgment.  This cured 
any jurisdictional defect in the case.  See In re Fosamax 
(Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 
150, 156 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1346.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review de novo a district court’s grant of a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Foglia v. Renal Ventures 
Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014); Ballentine 
v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2007).  We “are 
required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and 
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after 
construing them in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant.”  Foglia, 754 F.3d at 154 n.1 (citations omitted). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
As a matter of constitutional avoidance, we will first 
turn to Watson’s argument that § 922(o) of the Gun Control 
Act does not apply to a trust.  See Crowell v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the 
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of 
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this 
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Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute 
is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).  
Watson argues that § 922(o) of the Gun Control Act does not 
apply to a trust because § 922(o) applies only to “persons” 
and a trust is not a “person” under the terms of the statute.   
 
With certain narrow exceptions, the provision states 
that “it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess 
a machinegun.”  18 U.S.C. § 922(o).  The Gun Control Act 
defines a person as “any individual, company, association, 
firm, partnership, society, or joint stock company.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(a)(1).  As Watson notes, a “trust” is not one of the 
listed entities.  However, this does not mean that a trust is 
therefore entitled to possess a machine gun. 
 
As the District Court stated, a trust is not an entity 
distinct from its trustees, nor is it capable of legal action on its 
own behalf.  76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 3 (citing Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts § 2 (2003)).  Indeed, Watson himself does 
not dispute that he is the “individual human being” seeking to 
possess a gun on behalf of the Trust.  He argues, however, 
that because trusts are not “persons” under the statute, he may 
act on behalf of the Trust in his capacity as a trustee without 
triggering the prohibition on natural persons transferring or 
possessing a machine gun.  Appellant’s Br. 55-56.  But 
nothing in the Gun Control Act supports such a reading.  
Irrespective of whether Watson is a trustee, he is also a 
natural person and therefore prohibited from performing any 
of the acts forbidden of natural persons under the Gun 
Control Act.  His inability to comply with the Gun Control 
Act, in turn, prevents ATF from granting his application 
under the National Firearms Act.  See 26 U.S.C. § 5822; 27 
C.F.R. § 479.65. 
Moreover, this holding is necessarily correct because 
to interpret the Gun Control Act as Watson suggests would 
allow any party—including convicted felons, who are 
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expressly prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—to avoid liability under this section 
simply by placing a machine gun “in trust.”  Any “individual, 
company, association, firm, partnership, society, or joint 
stock company” could lawfully possess a machine gun using 
this method.  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(1).  Interpreting the statute 
so as to include this exception would thereby swallow the 
rule.  We refuse to conclude that with one hand Congress 
intended to enact a statutory rule that would restrict the 
transfer or possession of certain firearms, but with the other 
hand it created an exception that would destroy that very rule.  
See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 315 (3d Cir. 
2001) (rejecting an interpretation of a statute that would allow 
the exception to swallow the rule); In re New York City 
Shoes, Inc., 880 F.2d 679, 685 n.6 (3d Cir. 1989) (same); see 
also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 n.13 (1976) (same).   
 
We turn next to Watson’s argument that § 922(o) is 
unconstitutional facially and as-applied to Watson under the 
Second Amendment.  We agree with the District Court that 
Watson offers no facts to distinguish why the challenged laws 
should not apply to him.  Therefore, we will treat Watson’s 
claim as a facial challenge.  The Second Amendment reads, 
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed.”  U.S. Const. amend. II.  To determine 
whether § 922(o) impermissibly burdens the Second 
Amendment right, we must begin with District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).   
 
In Heller, the Supreme Court struck down several 
statutes in the District of Columbia prohibiting the possession 
of handguns and requiring lawfully owned firearms to be kept 
inoperable.  554 U.S. at 635.  Grounding its inquiry in 
historical analysis, the Court found that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms, 
11 
 
at least for purposes of self-defense in the home.  Id. at 576, 
636.  However, the Court warned that “the right [is] not a 
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”  Id. at 626; see also 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) 
(plurality opinion).  The Court recognized that “the Second 
Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain 
types of weapons,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 623 (citing United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)), and specified that it 
was referring to those weapons “in common use” and not 
“those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes,” id. at 625, 627.  Turning to the 
handgun ban at issue in the case, the Court struck down the 
ban because it “amount[ed] to a prohibition of an entire class 
of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American 
society” for the “lawful purpose” of self-defense in the home, 
“where the need for defense of self, family, and property is 
most acute.”  Id. at 628.   
 
Based on Heller, we adopted a two-pronged approach 
to Second Amendment challenges.  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 
89.  “First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a 
burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s guarantee.”  Id.  If it does not, the inquiry ends.  
Id.  If it does, we move on to the second step: “[W]e evaluate 
the law under some form of means-end scrutiny.  If the law 
passes muster under that standard, it is constitutional.  If it 
fails, it is invalid.”  Id.   
 
Heller and subsequent decisions in our Court make 
clear that the de facto ban on machine guns found in § 922(o) 
does not impose a burden on conduct falling within the scope 
of the Second Amendment.  Turning first to Heller, we note 
that that opinion discusses machine guns on several 
occasions, and each time suggests that these weapons may be 
banned without burdening Second Amendment rights.  See 
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Heller, 554 U.S. at 627-28 (“It may be objected that if 
weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles 
and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment 
right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. . . . 
But the fact that modern developments have limited the 
degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected 
right cannot change our interpretation of the right.”); id. at 
624 (suggesting that it would be a “startling” reading of 
Miller that restrictions on machine guns are unconstitutional).  
 
Next, we turn to our Circuit’s caselaw.  We examined 
this question in Marzzarella.  Marzzarella concerned whether 
Appellant Michael Marzzarella’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(k) for possession of a handgun with an obliterated 
serial number violated his Second Amendment rights.  614 
F.3d at 87.  We reiterated that “[a]t its core, the Second 
Amendment protects the right of law-abiding citizens to 
possess non-dangerous weapons for self-defense in the 
home,” and thus, under Heller, “restrictions on the possession 
of dangerous and unusual weapons are not constitutionally 
suspect because these weapons are outside the ambit of the 
amendment.”  Id. at 91, 92 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, 
635).  Marzzarella argued that because he possessed the 
unlawful weapon in his home, the challenged statute 
regulated protected conduct.  However, we found that “it 
cannot be the case that possession of a firearm in the home 
for self-defense is a protected form of possession under all 
circumstances.”  Id. at 94.  If this were the case, “[p]ossession 
of machine guns or short-barreled shotguns—or any other 
dangerous and unusual weapon—so long as they were kept in 
the home, would then fall within the Second Amendment.  
But the Supreme Court has made clear that the Second 
Amendment does not protect those types of weapons.”  Id. 
(citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; United States v. Fincher, 538 
F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1174 
(2009)).    
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In case Marzzarella left any doubt, we repeat today 
that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession 
of machine guns.  They are not in common use for lawful 
purposes.  See, e.g., Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 
(1968) (describing machine guns as “weapons used 
principally by persons engaged in unlawful activities”); 
United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 799 n.4 (5th Cir. 
1999) (noting “machine guns . . . are primarily weapons of 
war and have no appropriate sporting use or use for personal 
protection”) (quoting S. Rep No. 90-1501, at 28 (1968)); H.R. 
Rep. No. 99-495, at 4 (1986) (noting that machine guns are 
“used by racketeers and drug traffickers for intimidation, 
murder and protection of drugs and the proceeds of crime”); 
H.R. Rep. No. 90-1956, at 34 (1968) (Conf. Rep.), as 
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4434 (describing 
machine guns as “gangster-type weapons”).  They are also 
exceedingly dangerous weapons.  See, e.g., United States v. 
O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 230 (2010) (noting “[t]he immense 
danger posed by machineguns”); United States v. Henry, 688 
F.3d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 996 
(2013) (“A modern machine gun can fire more than 1,000 
rounds per minute, allowing a shooter to kill dozens of people 
within a matter of seconds.  Short of bombs, missiles, and 
biochemical agents, we can conceive of few weapons that are 
more dangerous than machine guns.”) (internal citation 
omitted); United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1001 (5th Cir. 
1997) (en banc) (per curiam) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) 
(“Machine guns possess a firepower that outstrips any other 
kind of gun.”).  As such, Heller dictates that they fall outside 
the protection of the Second Amendment. 
 
Our sister circuits have consistently come to similar 
conclusions.  In Fincher, the Eighth Circuit found that 
“[m]achine guns are not in common use by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the 
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category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the 
government can prohibit for individual use.”  538 F.3d at 874.  
We previously quoted this very sentence in our opinion in 
Marzzarella.  In Henry, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “machine 
guns are highly ‘dangerous and unusual weapons’ that are not 
‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes.’”  688 F.3d at 640.  And in Heller v. District of 
Columbia (“Heller II”), the D.C. Circuit noted that “Heller 
suggests that ‘M-16 rifles and the like’ may be banned 
because they are ‘dangerous and unusual.’”  670 F.3d 1244, 
1263 (D.C. Cir. 2011); cf. Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 
471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1115 (2010) 
(the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of 
unregistered machine guns); Friedman v. City of Highland 
Park, Illinois, 784 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 136 S. Ct. 447 
(2015) (upholding a ban on semi-automatic assault weapons 
against a Second Amendment challenge). 
 
Watson nonetheless argues that the District Court 
misapplied Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” language 
because the doctrine does not pertain to “the mere possession 
of a firearm,” but only applies to “the manner in which that 
right is exercised.”  Appellant’s Br. 18.  As the above 
discussion suggests, Watson’s unconventional reading 
contradicts the interpretation adopted by all of the federal 
circuits that have considered this language.  See, e.g., 
Friedman, 784 F.3d at 409; New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 256 (2d Cir. 2015); Henry, 
688 F.3d 637; Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244; Marzzarella, 614 
F.3d 85; United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 
2010); Fincher, 538 F.3d 868.  Watson himself concedes that 
“a majority of courts” interpret the “dangerous and unusual” 
language in Heller to describe possession of a weapon, 
Appellant’s Reply Br. 12, but in fact no case was found 
adopting the alternative analysis proposed by Watson.   
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This is likely because Heller plainly states that mere 
possession of certain weapons may be prohibited.  See, e.g., 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (noting that the Second Amendment 
is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever”) 
(emphasis added); id. at 627 (suggesting that the possession 
of “M-16 rifles and the like” may be banned); id. at 624 
(same); see also Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (holding that short-
barreled shotguns are unprotected under the Second 
Amendment).  And looking at the “dangerous and unusual” 
phrase in context, the most logical reading is that “dangerous 
and unusual” describes certain categories of weapons, and not 
the manner in which the weapons are used.  The Court 
discusses “dangerous and unusual” weapons immediately 
after discussing what “sorts of weapons” Miller protects, and 
just before the Court discusses why certain types of weapons, 
even those “that are most useful in military service—M-16 
rifles and the like—” may be banned.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 
627.  We therefore decline to adopt Watson’s interpretation of 
Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” language. 
 
Similarly, Watson’s arguments against categorical 
bans on certain firearms fail to persuade.  Heller limits its 
holding to bans on “handguns held and used for self-defense 
in the home.”  Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.  Heller gives special 
consideration to the District of Columbia’s categorical ban on 
handguns because they “are the most popular weapon chosen 
by Americans for self-defense in the home.”  Id. at 629.  This 
does not mean that a categorical ban on any particular type of 
bearable arm is unconstitutional.  As explained above, Heller 
contains clear statements to the contrary.  
 
Nor does our opinion in Marzzarella support Watson’s 
argument, as he suggests.  When Marzzarella discusses 
categorical decisions, the opinion objects to the idea of 
categorically protecting certain weapons, not categorically 
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banning them.  See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 94 (“[I]t also 
would make little sense to categorically protect a class of 
weapons bearing a certain characteristic wholly unrelated to 
their utility.”).  In fact, Marzzarella specifically recognizes 
that there are particular categories of weapons that fall outside 
the protection of the Second Amendment.  See, e.g., id. at 90-
91 (noting that “the right to bear arms, as codified in the 
Second Amendment, affords no protection to weapons not 
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes”); id. at 92 (noting that “the Second Amendment 
affords no protection for the possession of dangerous and 
unusual weapons”).  When discussing machine guns and 
short-barreled shotguns, the opinion states that “the Supreme 
Court made clear the Second Amendment does not protect 
those types of weapons.”  Id. at 94-95.  Nothing in Heller or 
Marzzarella supports Watson’s argument. 
 
Because we find that under Heller and Marzzarella the 
possession of a machine gun is not protected under the 
Second Amendment, our inquiry is at an end.  These cases 
make clear that § 922(o) does not burden conduct falling 
within the scope of the Second Amendment, and thus, 
Watson’s facial challenge to § 922(o) must fail.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 Since the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller, courts 
nationwide have debated the parameters of that decision, and 
the extent to which government regulation may be reconciled 
with the Second Amendment.  However, on at least one issue 
the courts are in agreement: governments may restrict the 
possession of machine guns.  This finding follows from prior 
caselaw and the plain language provided by the Supreme 
Court.  We decline to depart from this standard today.  
Further, we decline to reinterpret the Gun Control Act to 
allow an individual to circumvent the law through the use of a 
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trust.  For these reasons, the District Court’s opinion will be 
affirmed.  
  
